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Chapter 6
The Evolution of Workplace Advice
Christopher L. Jones and Jason S. Scott
The past few decades have brought a profound shift in employer retire-
ment plans, away from professionally managed pension assets, and toward
individuals bearing the burdens of their own investment and saving deci-
sions. Tens of millions of employees today are faced with making investing
and saving decisions in defined contribution (DC) plans that will have a
significant impact on their future quality of life. In response to these
changes, employers are increasingly providing employees with access to
specific investment advice. Yet the workplace environment creates substan-
tial challenges for traditional methods of providing investment advice. This
chapter shows how the workplace advice market has evolved over the last
fifteen years, how technology has changed the creation and delivery of
investment advice, and how the regulatory environment has influenced the
availability and usage of advice in DC plans.
A key characteristic of workplace investment advisory services in the
United States is that they must address the requirements and preferences
of three distinct groups of stakeholders: government regulators, plan spon-
sors (employers), and plan participants (employees). One can think of
each of these stakeholders as representing filters through which any suc-
cessful advice solution must be able to pass. For instance, a workplace
advice solution that fails to meet regulatory requirements is a non-starter
in the marketplace. Likewise, one that meets regulatory requirements but
fails to address plan sponsor concerns will not be provided. And individual
participants must also want to use the advisory services if they are to have any
impact on investment behavior. Finally, an advisory service must be able to
cost-effectively meet the needs of a wide spectrum of plan participants.
Successful workplace advisory services must also address the needs of
varied workforces, helping employees create appropriate investment strat-
egies to achieve their retirement goals. Many plan participants have little
experience with investing and hold modest account balances, unlike the
affluent customers of traditional registered investment advisors (RIAs). For
instance, the median 401(k) account balance in Financial Engines’
member base in 2011 was approximately $38,000.1 Providing personalized
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investment advice to clients with such modest balances places additional
requirements on the scalability of the advice provider’s business model.
Moreover, plan participants differ in terms of their knowledge, level of
engagement, risk preferences, and financial circumstances. Addressing
the advice needs of such participants therefore requires a multi-faceted
approach to engagement and communication. As gatekeepers to the
employee population, plan sponsors play an important role in determining
which advisory services are available to their plans. Fiduciary responsibil-
ities under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) require
plan sponsors to engage in an appropriate selection process in hiring a
provider of workplace advisory services. Because of this due diligence
requirement, plan sponsors are an important constituency in the develop-
ment and distribution of workplace advisory services. Finally, as we will see,
the actions of government regulators and policymakers, particularly the
Department of Labor (DOL) and Congress, have played an important role
in shaping evolution of workplace investment advice.
Workplace advice: filling the vacuum
In the mid-1990s, DC plans, and especially 401(k) plans, began to play a
central role for many US workers. Originally viewed as supplemental plans
to augment traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions, many companies
now use the 401(k) as the primary retirement vehicle offered to employees.
This move shifted the burden for making investment decisions and bearing
investment risk onto individual investors. Many plan sponsors and policy-
makers began to recognize the large gap between the knowledge and
expertise of typical plan participants, as well as the need to make informed
investment decisions to shape retirement outcomes.
During most of the 1980s and 1990s, help offered to rank-and-file
employees was mainly limited to generic education about investing con-
cepts. Communications provided to plan participants discussed general
concepts of diversification and asset allocation, but most did little to
provide specific help in constructing an appropriate portfolio using plan
investment options. Moreover, many firms provided simple deterministic
retirement calculators designed to illustrate the value of compounding and
regular saving.
A key problem with these simple models was that they encouraged risk-
taking by characterizing asset allocation as a ‘return-return’ tradeoff. That
is, many such calculators asked participants to provide an assumed rate of
return used to compound uniformly over the investment horizon, so as to
produce an estimate of future retirement wealth. But because these
calculations were purely deterministic, it appeared that there was no
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downside to simply picking the asset allocation with the highest expected
return; they ignored investment risk. While institutional investors, notably
DB pension plans, had long used sophisticated simulation techniques to
help assess the impact of investment risk and make informed choices
about risk preferences, such tools were not widely available to individual
investors until the mid-1990s. The complexity and costs of developing
such models put them out of reach for all but the most affluent investors
and their advisors.
Economics and technology were not the only barriers to participants
obtaining access to high-quality investment advice in the workplace: spon-
sor concerns played a role as well. Plans sponsors were wary of jeopardizing
their fiduciary protections under Section 404(c) of ERISA.2 Many sponsors
became concerned about providing assistance that might be construed as
offering direct investment advice to their employees, fearing that if partici-
pants followed such advice and subsequently lost money, employers might
be sued. Nevertheless, it grew increasingly clear that many plan participants
did a poor job of investing their 401(k) accounts. Common mistakes
included overconcentration in employer stock, chasing past performance,
selecting inappropriate risk levels, and failing to take advantage of savings
opportunities including employer matching contributions. Both employ-
ers and government regulators began to view participants’ decision-making
with alarm, finding that most participants were neither well informed
about retirement investing, nor adequately engaged in managing their
investments.
The regulatory environment also played a key role in explaining the
dearth of workplace advice during the early 1990s. In the United States,
401(k) plans are subject to ERISA which imposes strict limitations on
entities providing advice to qualified plan participants. At its core, ERISA
seeks to protect plan participants from self-dealing and other conflicts of
interest. In the early years of the 401(k) industry, the natural providers of
investment advice at large scale, namely large record keepers and asset
management firms, were generally prohibited from offering plan partici-
pants investment advice. Under ERISA, such advice from an investment
manager in the plan would trigger a prohibited transaction, with severe
penalties for the infracting institution. The ERISA prohibited transaction
rules prevent an investment manager from offering advice on its own
products, when there is an economic incentive for self-dealing. Since
neither plan sponsors nor plan providers showed much interest in offering
investment advice due to these legal and compliance concerns, plan par-
ticipants were largely left on their own.
Recognizing the reluctance of sponsors to offer needed help to plan
participants, regulators looked for ways to clarify how such help could be
provided safely. In 1996, the US Department of Labor (DOL) issued
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Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, which sought to encourage plan sponsors to
offer more help to struggling employees. The bulletin marked a milestone
in the market for workplace advisory services, as it helped in two important
ways: it provided a clear definition of the line between educational
guidance and investment advice for plan sponsors under ERISA, and it
showed that the DOL favored making more help available to plan partici-
pants. Through subsequent related communications, the DOL offered a
roadmap for sponsors on how to provide advice safely by hiring an inde-
pendent fiduciary to give advice to plan participants. In this way, plan
sponsors could avoid liability for the advice provided as long as they
engaged in a prudent selection and monitoring process. This signaled a
shift in the historical view that participants were ‘on their own’ when it
came to making investment decisions in their retirement plans, and it led
to many sponsors playing a role in helping their employees with this
important and challenging burden.
A new model for workplace advice
The US workplace advice market began to take off in the mid-1990s with
the rapid rise in employee access to the Internet. This provided a conduit
to reach millions of participants in retirement plans at low cost, and to
provide them with interactive advisory services to help them manage their
investment choices. In 1995 and 1996, two venture capital-backed startup
firms, 401(k) Forum (later mPower) and Financial Engines, were founded
in California to provide independent, cost-effective, investment advice for
401(k) plan participants. Both firms adopted the business model of selling
independent advisory services to employers who would in turn make these
available to their plan participants.
A key attribute of the new approach was to avert the potential for
prohibited transactions under ERISA by avoiding the sale or manufacture
of investment products. To prevent any incentives for self-dealing, it was
necessary to have a business model where advisory services revenues did not
depend on the advice itself. By structuring the firm to be independent of
the plan funds, it was possible to provide investment advice without violat-
ing ERISA rules against self-dealing.
Financial Engines was co-founded in 1996 by William Sharpe, a financial
economist and Nobel Laureate at Stanford University, and Joseph Grundf-
est, a professor at the Stanford Law School and a former Commissioner at
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The founding vision for
the company was to bring best practices from academic finance and insti-
tutional money management to bear on the needs of everyday investors.
With the explosive growth of the Internet, Sharpe saw an opportunity to
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apply technology to the problem of delivering high-quality personalized
investment advice to plan participants, irrespective of their account
balances.
Until this point, it had been too expensive to rigorously apply the
techniques of modern financial economics to individual investment prob-
lems on a mass basis. Investment advisors had historically focused on high-
net-worth investors, personally interacting with each client to develop a
personalized investment strategy. These advisors were expected to have
deep expertise in finance and other domains, and as a part of their services,
they spent substantial time developing relationships with each client. The
costs of providing investment advisory through this model were and still are
considerable. For instance, most independent investment advisors charge
for their services as an annual percentage of a client’s assets. Fees for
investment advisory services generally range from 50 basis points (0.5 per-
cent) to more than 200 basis points (2 percent) of assets under manage-
ment, depending on the types of services provided and the size of the client
account. For the process to be profitable for the advisor, the client account
must generate sufficient fees to cover advisors’ overhead and compensa-
tion. This model is not economically feasible for clients with only a few
thousand dollars in their 401(k) accounts. The advance offered by Finan-
cial Engines and other firms targeting the 401(k) advice market was tech-
nology infrastructure that made it economically feasible at large scale
to provide personalized investment advice to participants with modest
balances. Plan sponsors demanded services that could help all their
employees, not just the affluent. By using technology to automate much
of the investment analysis process, it now became possible to provide high-
quality advice at a much lower cost than in the past.
Experience with online advice
Financial Engines went live with its first online investment advisory service
for 401(k) plan participants in 1998. The online advice service provided
plan participants with specific recommendations on which funds to buy
and sell, so as to create appropriate retirement investment strategies. Users
would log onto the service and interactively explore the tradeoffs associ-
ated with different combinations of investment risk, saving, and retirement
horizons. This ‘outcomes-based’ approach emulated techniques used in
asset-liabilities studies performed for large pension plans, but now at the
scale of individual participants instead of a large DB plan with thousands of
beneficiaries. For the first time, plan participants could get realistic views
of their retirement outcomes via sophisticated Monte Carlo simulation.
Moreover, they could explore how different decisions might alter the
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probabilities of reaching their goals. Finally, leveraging the expertise built
into the optimization engine, they could receive specific recommendations
on how to take the best advantage of investment options available in their
401(k) plans. The cost of the service was picked up by the employer, so that
participants could use it without any out-of-pocket expense. This was an
important consideration in getting plan participants to take advantage of
the service, since requiring participant-initiated payments up front would
have placed an additional barrier to adoption of the service.
Sponsors who were early adopters of these new services and benefits
generally reacted favorably to the availability of personalized investment
advice for their employees. Many sponsors were familiar with the failure of
generic education to ‘move the needle’ and change investor behavior, and
some were concerned about the potential litigation risk associated with
high levels of company stock held by some employees.
Larger plan sponsors also played an important role in the evolution of
online advice programs, demanding on close integration with their record-
keeping platforms to provide participants with convenient access to their
own data, as well as the ability to execute transactions at the press of a
button. In addition, various plan complexities needed to be handled
gracefully. For instance, some plans had trading restrictions that shaped
how participants could trade over time. Plans with stable value funds often
had equity wash provisions that constrained how money could flow out
of the stable value fund into other fixed income options. Other sponsors
had multiple plans for certain participants. Between 1998 and 2011, Finan-
cial Engines expanded the capabilities of the online advice service to
address these needs and provide a more convenient experience for plan
participants.
Nevertheless, there were still challenges in getting some participants to
pay attention to personalized advice. Many did respond more favorably
to personalized advice than they did to generic education, but the uptake
of professional advice was not universal. Convenience proved to be a major
factor in the adoption of online advisory services. One of the most import-
ant convenience features was the ability to download participant data from
the record-keeping system so as to minimize the amount of information
that had to be manually entered by each plan participant. Financial
Engines also found that sponsor endorsement of the advisory services was
important in driving adoption. To this end, participants needed to be
made aware of the service, as well as how it could benefit their futures.
Participants tended to value the due diligence provided by their employers,
and they were more likely to trust the advice when it was endorsed by their
employers.
As Financial Engines gained experience with different plan populations,
it became apparent that demographic factors influenced adoption patterns
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for online advice. The usage of online advice was also observed to vary
widely by plan sponsor. In the first year of deployment, an average plan
sponsor might see around 10–15 percent of the workforce use online
advice. Yet white collar workers, particularly those in technology-related
fields, often had adoption rates that were double or triple this average. By
contrast, plan sponsors with a population dominated by factory workers
in manufacturing or transportation often saw lower usage. Figure 6.1 shows
the distribution of online advice adoption across a sample of more than
450 plan sponsors at Financial Engines as of the end of Q4 2011.
The variation in usage is striking, varying from 28 percent at the 95th
percentile, to only 1 percent at the 5th percentile. The average usage
weighted by participants was 11 percent. The top end of usage was generally
the result of favorable demographics and aggressive communication pro-
grams. The lower end of the distribution included firms that either had
recently introduced advice or had made no communication offers.
Online advice users also differ somewhat from the broader plan partici-
pant population: they tend to be slightly younger and significantly wealth-
ier than average participants. They also save more and are generally
more engaged with the 401(k) plan than their average co-workers.
Table 6.1 provides a comparison of online advice users and the general
plan population.3
1%
11%
28%
5th Percentile Weighted Average 95th Percentile
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
%
Figure 6.1 Online advice usage
Source : Authors’ computation from the Financial Engines database (December 31, 2011).
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Overall, online advice services tend to appeal to wealthier, more engaged
plan participants, who tend to be influential in plan sponsor decisions
around plan design. In this sense, they differ from the average participant
in most companies offering advisory services.
The 2001 SunAmerica Advisory Opinion
There was a significant regulatory development having an important
impact on the workplace advice market in 2001. The SunAmerica corpor-
ation petitioned the DOL for an Advisory Opinion to permit the company
to provide investment advice under its own brand to 401(k) participants in
plans where its products were included in the lineup, but with the condi-
tion that the advice would be generated by an independent third-party
expert. The DOL (2001) issued the SunAmerica Advisory Opinion provid-
ing specific conditions under which this arrangement could avoid pro-
hibited transaction prohibitions under ERISA. The practical impact of
this Advisory Opinion was that now, larger asset management firms and
record keepers in the 401(k) space could work with independent advisory
firms to bundle investment advice with other services offered to plan
participants and do so under their own branding. Over the next few
years, many 401(k) financial service firms joined forces with independent
advisors like Financial Engines to provide integrated advisory services on
their platforms. By allowing 401(k) firms to offer advice under their own
brands, it become easier to deeply integrate investment advice into the
401(k) platform and further increase customer convenience. This also
accelerated the adoption of advisory services by plan sponsors, as often
the advice was bundled in with other 401(k) services.
These developments offered independent advisory firms like Financial
Engines an opportunity to expand the reach of advisory services and thus
further leverage the large fixed costs associated with building sophisticated
Table 6.1 Demographic comparison of online advice users
Online advice users Overall covered workforce
Average age (years) 46.3 46.4
Average balance ($) 159,103 89,549
Median balance ($) 74,828 30,579
Average salary ($) 87,813 69,358
Average savings rate
(as percent of salary)
9.0 7.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from a Financial Engines database query Q1, 2012.
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advisory platforms. They also accelerated the view that independent advis-
ory services in 401(k) plans were an emerging ‘best practice’ among larger
employers. As the market for online advisory services matured, it became
increasingly clear that only a subset of plan participants was willing to
spend the time and effort to interact with an online advisory service to
interactively build and implement retirement plans. Despite ongoing com-
munications campaigns, it was difficult to achieve adoption rates much
beyond one-quarter of the plan population for most sponsors. The key
question then became, how to reach the other three-quarters of the par-
ticipant population?
Managed accounts
Financial Engines embarked on a development effort to design services to
better address the needs of the participants disinclined to use online advice
in 2003. Extensive participant interviews and focus groups were conducted
to determine what this population of ‘reluctant investors’ was looking for in
terms of retirement help, and two key themes emerged. First, many partici-
pants were not interested in, or did not have the time to, engaging in an
interactive online planning experience. Instead, they sought a ‘hands-off ’
solution that would allow them to delegate the responsibility of managing
their accounts with minimal day-to-day involvement. For such participants,
managing a retirement portfolio was a burden they preferred not to bear.
Another segment of the population, particularly older participants closer
to their retirement dates, was looking for access to human advisors to whom
they could address questions and validate their decisions. At times, the
latter participants were nervous about implementing decisions without
consulting with an expert. Combining insights from these two population
segments, it became apparent that a service was needed that offered access
to telephone-based advisors with a discretionary account management
structure.
The idea of discretionary management in a 401(k) account was easily
accommodated within ERISA through Section 3(38), which permits fidu-
ciary investment managers to make decisions on behalf of plan participants
while shielding the plan sponsor who selects the investment manager from
liability associated with the investment decisions of the manager. This long-
established framework, in place for decades in traditional DB plans, was
familiar to plan sponsors. Of course, prohibited transaction prohibitions
still apply, as they do for investment advice. Since Financial Engines
and other independent vendors of managed accounts were not selling or
managing the plan funds, they could avoid the potential for self-dealing. In
practice, getting sponsors comfortable with hiring an investment manager
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to offer managed accounts was actually easier than overcoming liability
concerns in the early years of selling online investment advice.
Financial Engines launched its first managed account clients in 2004,
and by year-end it had amassed over $1 billion in assets under manage-
ment. The service was structured as a discretionary managed account
program, where Financial Engines took over control of the investment
portfolios on behalf of participants. Once a participant enrolled, Financial
Engines would generate a Plan Preview illustrating the proposed portfolio
allocation based on information drawn from the record-keeping platform.
The Plan Preview disclosed the data and assumptions on which the advice
was based, and it provided participants with the ability to further personal-
ize their proposals online or by calling phone-based investment advisor
representatives. Program members could customize their risk preferences,
retirement ages, outside assets, and preferences for holding company stock
within the program. If a member personalized his or her account, a revised
Plan Preview would be generated showing the new recommendations. At
any point along the way, managed account users had the ability to speak
with investment advisory representatives who could answer general retire-
ment questions, help participants personalize their retirement plans, and
provide help with retirement income planning. In the case of Financial
Engines, investment advisors use specialized software to generate these
investment recommendations and provide forecasts and diagnostic statis-
tics. As with online advice, these investment recommendations are strictly
generated by the advice platform, insuring consistent high-quality advice
independent of which advisor a participant works with.
A key distinction between online advice and managed accounts is that a
member need not take any action to have the plan implemented. Once a
member joins the program, Financial Engines takes care of the transac-
tions required to move funds to the target portfolio, and then it monitors
each account on an ongoing basis, making adjustments as required.
Similar to target date fund strategies, the allocation of the managed
account portfolio gradually becomes more conservative as a member
approaches his or her retirement date. Unlike a target date fund, each
portfolio is individually tailored to the participant. For instance, a more
risk-averse participant might see an allocation tilted toward fixed income
investments, compared to a risk-seeking participant. Also, a managed
account approach can adapt to plan-specific circumstances such as the
existence of a cash balance plan or a position in restricted company stock.
By personalizing fund allocations to account for such individual and plan
differences, the program can offer participants more efficient allocations
better suited to their needs.
Another important attribute of managed accounts is that plan partici-
pants pay the fees for the program from their DC accounts. As a rule,
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managed account participants pay an asset-based fee for the discretionary
management of their accounts, similar to the way in which fee-only invest-
ment advisors charge for their services. This account fee is usually deducted
from the participant’s account balance once a quarter (in arrears). Since
plan sponsors do not have to pay for the services, there are fewer barriers to
offering such a program to a plan population. Naturally, since participants
pay for this service, it is still necessary to overcome the potential reluctance
to pay for account management. But because of the scale economies
provided by the large plan market, 401(k) managed account services are
typically offered at a fraction of the standard discretionary management
fees charged in the retail marketplace. Typical retail fees for discretionary
management range from 75 to more than 150 basis points of assets under
management annually, whereas the fees for Financial Engines’ managed
account services range from 20 to 60 basis points, depending on the
enrollment method and the size of the participant’s account balance.
We have also found that participants who select managed accounts differ
from the larger plan population.4 First, managed account users tend to be
older on average, by about one to two years. Second, average account
balances of managed account clients are similar to the overall plan average,
but median account balances are higher. For instance, in our managed
account population, the average balance is 105 percent of the overall
participant population, but the median balance is 145 percent of the
overall average. This implies that managed account users tend to have
fewer very large accounts, and fewer very small accounts. Many plan partici-
pants with very large balances often have established relationships with
outside investment advisors. For participants with very small balances,
there is generally little urgency to getting help with an investment strategy
for retirement. Third, in terms of salary and savings rates, managed
account users are similar to the overall participant average (see Table 6.2).
Interestingly, online advice users tend to place a high premium
on maintaining control over their accounts and investment decisions.
Table 6.2 Demographic comparison of managed account users
Managed account users Overall population
Average age (years) 47.5 46.4
Average balance ($) 93,884 89,549
Median balance ($) 44,301 30,579
Average salary ($) 70,138 69,358
Average savings rate
(as percent of salary)
7.2 7.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from a Financial Engines database query Q1, 2012.
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By contrast, most managed account users see value in being able to dele-
gate investment decisions to a trustworthy expert. Consequently, the usage
of managed accounts in plans that previously offered online advice tends to
be additive. Figure 6.2 shows the total usage distribution for Financial
Engines sponsors (as of year-end 2011). Overall, the usage rates of man-
aged account participants appear similar to that of online advice users, but
a different subset of the participant population is involved. With the
addition of managed accounts, overall usage of advisory services doubled
from 11 to 22 percent. Of course, usage of managed accounts will differ
according to participant demographics and the level of communications
provided to create awareness and understanding of the program.
From a plan sponsor’s perspective, managed accounts can be a valuable
addition because they have a demonstrable impact on investor behavior.
Unlike online investment advice, where participants are free to ignore the
advice or only partially implement a set of recommendations, managed
accounts insure compliance by construction. Once participants turn over
control of their accounts to the investment manager, the account is opti-
mized and periodically reviewed for any required changes. No participant
action is required to implement the advice. By taking the responsibility
for implementation of the recommendations out of participants’ hands,
4%
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5th Percentile Weighted Average 95th Percentile
% 100
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0
Figure 6.2 Aggregate usage (online and management)
Source: Authors’ computations from the Financial Engines database (December 31, 2011).
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it is possible to insure that appropriate adjustments to the investment
allocation are made on a timely basis. This is particularly helpful in per-
suading participants to reduce their exposure to company stock, a common
mistake in 401(k) plans (which can elicit emotional and behavioral reac-
tions). Many participants make the mistake of equating familiarity with
safety when it comes to their employer’s stock, but company stock is the
largest contributor to undiversified risk in many participant portfolios and
can be a potential source of litigation risk for employers. Over the course of
Financial Engines’ managed account program since 2004, over $6.5 billion
of company stock positions have been diversified into fixed income and
equity positions.5
The introduction of managed accounts also had a profound impact on
participants’ utilization of workplace advisory services. The innovation
made it possible for ‘reluctant investors’ to receive similar benefits from
professional help that had been previously limited to the most engaged
participants. But events in 2006 provided a further push toward more
widespread usage of advice in the workplace.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006
In the early 2000s, researchers found that 401(k) plans which changed
their default options often saw dramatic changes in the choices made by
their participants. Specifically, automatic enrollment substantially
increased plan participation across the board. Yet, for all its benefits,
auto-enrollment created new challenges for plan sponsors. Concerns
regarding fiduciary responsibility again became central, since implementa-
tion required plan sponsors to select a default investment. Given the
realities of auto-enrollment, a large fraction of employees would likely be
fully invested in whichever investment was selected as the plan’s default.
Many sponsors worried about potential liability if they selected a default
investment that subsequently lost money. To avoid this problem, sponsors
pioneering auto-enrollment techniques often selected a money market or
stable value fund as their plan default. This approach avoided the potential
for subsequent losses, but it created the chance that defaulted employees
might spend their entire investment careers fully allocated to short-term
fixed income investments.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) was passed, in large part, to
encourage widespread use of automatic enrollment, and to address spon-
sor fiduciary concerns. The PPA created a safe harbor for the investment
allocation by identifying three Qualified Default Investment Alternatives
(QDIAs). Utilizing a QDIA as the default investment provides a safe-harbor
shielding employers against liability from automatic enrollment should the
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QDIA suffer a loss. The three QDIAs identified were (a) a professionally
managed account, (b) a target date fund, or (c) a balanced fund.
Post-PPA, many plan sponsors selected either a target date fund menu or
a professionally managed account as their QDIA, primarily because these
two options were more personalized to the plan participant. Both
decreased investment risk as participants aged, with the managed account
option providing additional levels of personalization. The PPA was a boon
to the managed account business, since the halo associated with being a
QDIA caused many sponsors to consider managed accounts even if they
had not considered switching to automatic enrollment. As Figure 6.3 illus-
trates, the net increase in managed account clients peaked at over 120,000
in 2007, the year following enactment of the PPA.
The PPA described a mechanism to automatically enroll new employees
into a DC pension plan and created a safe harbor if the default investment
option was a QDIA. But by focusing exclusively on new hires, the vast majority
of plan participants were ignored. This led many sponsors to adapt
auto-enrollment for the entire workforce, a step made possible because of
the guidance and safe harbors provided by the PPA: plan sponsors essentially
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Figure 6.3 Net new managed account members
Source: Authors’ computations from the Financial Engines SEC Filings.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
120 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
‘re-enroll’ existing participants into a default investment option and follow
the same procedures outlined by the PPA. The main advantage of plan re-
enrollment is that all participants are provided with a reasonable asset
allocation, and participants must make an active election to alter their
portfolios. For example, a company might be concerned with high levels of
employer stock held inside its 401(k) plan. To make clear that company
stock holdings were the result of an active participant decision, a company
could re-enroll the entire plan into a QDIA. Then participants wishing to
hold company stock, or any other investment allocation, would need to
either opt out of the QDIA prior to the re-enrollment, or subsequently
proactively alter their investment allocations.
Results illustrate that inertia proves to be a powerful factor. Figure 6.4
reports usage statistics as of year-end 2011 in pension plans that included
some form of default (either for new hire or via plan re-enrollment).
Clearly, the difference in usage was dramatic. The 5th percentile increased
from 4 to 37 percent, indicating that even the lower range usage was
substantial. At the high end, defaulted plans had overall usage rates of
over 70 percent. The participant weighted average overall usage was 55 per-
cent for clients with some form of default, so usage in a default context was
more than double the average usage otherwise.
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Figure 6.4 Aggregate usage with defaults
Source: Authors’ computations from the Financial Engines database (December 31, 2011).
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Retirement income in DC plans
With trillions of dollars now accumulating in DC plans and Baby Boomers
retiring in large numbers, a key question becomes: how can participants
turn their DC assets into retirement income? Unlike DB plans, the 401(k)
and other DC plans were not designed to produce a steady stream of
retirement income. But recent regulatory changes have been targeted at
helping develop the DC marketplace for retirement income. The same
factors that governed the development of accumulation help for DC par-
ticipants are again in play: that is, regulations will define the environment,
sponsor preferences will determine which solutions get offered, and,
assuming a workable business model, individual preferences will largely
determine what gets used.
Since DC plans are increasingly displacing DB plans, a natural starting
point is to try and make income from DC plans seem comparable to income
from DB plans. This intuition has led sponsors and regulators to focus on
annuities as potential income solutions for DC plans. Nevertheless, partici-
pant behavior, sponsor preferences, and the current regulatory environ-
ment, all suggest that annuity solutions are a difficult sell in the DC
marketplace. The core reason is that many people seem reluctant to annui-
tize assets at retirement. Numerous researchers have studied this ‘annuity
puzzle,’ a term referring to the gap between predicted and actual annuity
demand. For example, Warner and Pleeter (2001) examined a group of
66,000 military personnel offered the option of a lump-sum or annuity
payout; they found that, even though the annuity payout was typically twice
as valuable as the lump sum, 90 percent of enlisted personnel and 50 percent
of officers opted for the lump-sum payout. Even more relevant, Vanguard
recently analyzed the decisions of participants in DB pension plans who were
given the option of taking their annuity benefit as a lump sum (Mottola and
Utkus, 2007). The results were striking: even in a traditional DB plan where
the pension benefit was consistently communicated as an income payout,
fully 73 percent of participants over the age of 55 selected a lump-sum
payout. For a cash balance type pension plan, where the annuity cash value
was more salient, 83 percent of participants over the age of 55 elected the
lump-sum payout option. This analysis also dealt a blow to the idea that plan
defaults result in high levels of annuity utilization, reporting that:
Less than one-quarter of married participants in our study chose an annuity, even
though it is the federally mandated default option for married couples. Married
participants worked actively to overcome the default annuity option by submitting a
written, notarized waiver. (Mottola and Utkus, 2007: 1)
Given the evident preference for liquidity over annuity income (even for
long-standing DB participants), it is small wonder that very few individuals
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with 401(k) or IRA assets annuitize any, much less a majority, of their
retirement portfolios.
When people do not elect payout annuities, it remains to be seen what
type of retirement income solutions will interest them. A number of possi-
bilities emerge, ranging from solutions that provide income while preserv-
ing liquidity, to those that use early retirement payouts from the 401(k)
plans to finance Social Security deferrals. While the options that will
succeed are not yet known, it is clear that inertia, participant demand,
sponsor support, and regulatory clarity will all likely play a large role in
shaping the evolving marketplace.
Conclusion
The current US pension system asks millions of Americans to rely on their
employer-sponsored DC pension plans for retirement income security. Yet
saving, investing, and creating retirement income from DC plans require a
level of financial expertise that many people lack. A positive development is
that the economies of scale achievable in the workplace now offer an oppor-
tunity to provide financial advisory help to those with insufficient assets to
attract the interest of a typical retail advisor. To take advantage of these
economies of scale, successful workplace offeringsmust be aware of a complex
environment and satisfy the preferences of many different constituencies.
The regulatory environment is an important framework for such services.
This creates some barriers, but more often it can influence plan sponsor
perceptions as to the riskiness of specific approaches. If an approach does
meet regulatory requirements, the next relevant hurdle is plan sponsor
acceptance. Since plan sponsors exercise wide latitude regarding services
for their pension plans, sponsor approval is required to achieve widespread
success. But ultimately, participants themselves must decide to take advan-
tage of the available help. Solutions that individuals ignore or dislike will
not enjoy long-term success. In the process, the importance of a workable
business model cannot be over-emphasized. Many approaches to financial
advice might meet with regulatory, sponsor, and individual approval, but
these are irrelevant if they cannot service the typical 401(k) participant with
less than $40,000 in investible assets.
Endnotes
1. This datum was derived from a query to the Financial Engines database. Popula-
tion median account balances were calculated on a sample of approximately
567,000 professional management (managed account) members.
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2. This provides certain fiduciary protections to plan sponsors with respect to the
liability arising from investment decisions made by their participants. The pro-
tections are conditional on various requirements, including adequate diversifi-
cation opportunities and other plan characteristics. If the 404(c) conditions are
met by the plan sponsor, then it would be shielded from liability deriving from
investment decisions made by plan participants.
3. Balances include total sponsored assets collected by Financial Engines (e.g., DC,
deferred compensation, cash balance, Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP),
profit sharing, and money purchase). In some cases, accounts ineligible for
online advice may be included. Traditional DB pension assets are excluded.
4. Balances include total sponsored assets collected by Financial Engines (e.g., DC,
deferred compensation, cash balance, ESOP, profit sharing, and money pur-
chase). In some cases, accounts ineligible for management may be included.
Traditional DB pension assets are excluded.
5. This evidence was derived from a query to the Financial Engines database
(December 31, 2011).
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